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SUMMARY
Summary: Income and Price Effects la an Alternate Exposition of the
Theory of Clubs. This paper presents a concise, but useful graphic
exposition of the theory of clubs, clarifies the role of comraderie and
congestion, and Investigates income and price effects upon club equili
brium. Price changes have the expected effect upon consumption of club
good services, and an unpredictable effect on equilibrium club member
ship and club purchases of club goods. Income effects explain both
the segregation of individuals in different clubs, and income-induced
movements between clubs. It is found that high income clubs will not
necessarily have small memberships, because there is a strong incentive
to add members to high income-high dues clubs.
INCOME AND PRICK EFFECTS IN AN ALTERNATE EXPOSITION
OF THE THEORY OF CLUBS
Introduction
As Buchanan noted in his original paper, the economic theory of
clubs "allows us to move one step forward in closing the awesome
Samuelson gap between the purely private and the purely public good."
[3, p.l]. Although the theory applies only to goods from which non-
payers can be excluded, the step forward his analysis permits is
large. An alternate exposition of the theory is presented in Richard
and Peggy Musgrave's textbook [6, pp. 615-622]; and a graphic conden
sation of their exposition was developed by Allen, Amacher, and
Tollison [1, pp. 386-91]. Although Ng [7, 8] has claimed that Buchanan's
equilibrium conditions are not Pareto optimal, Berglas [2] has
vindicated the Pareto efficiency rules derived by Buchanan and has
shown that firms supplying club services for user fees may attain the
efficiency conditions for clubs. A paper by Polinsky [9] explores
some possible extensions and applications of the theory of clubs to
local public finance issues. One suspects that the theory of clubs
will contribute significantly to further advances in the theory of
public finance.
This paper considers income and price effects upon club equilibrium
by using a concise graphical and mathematical exposition. This
exposition is also useful as a pedagogical Improvement since it efficiently
illustrates the essential relations of the model and the conditions under
which clubs with finite membership may be expected to exist. In our
exposition we clarify two points inadequately treated by Buchanan:
(a) the role of comraderle in the model, and (b) the differences
between purely public goods (in the Samuelson sence), and goods which
are not purely public, but which are sufficiently public to result in
equilbrium club membership of infinity.
In our analysis of income effects we verify Buchanan's argument
that higher income leads to reduced club membership when the quantity
of the club good is held constant. However, we also show that increased
income may either increase or decrease equilbrium club membership if
the level of club goods is allowed to vary. This ambiguity results
from a previously neglected effect, namely that the economic Incentive
to expand membership is stronger in high income clubs than in low
income clubs. We present an economic explanation for the tendency of
clubs and communities to be segregated by income levels, for individuals
to change clubs when their income changes, and an explanation for the
rich remaining in sharing arrangements. We find that club good price
changes have the expected effect on consumption of club good services,
but that the new service lev«l may be provided via a club which is
either larger or smaller in terms of membership and purchases of
club goods. The income and substitution effects of a price change upon
club good purchases and club membership are separated in "Slutsky
equations."
The Model
To facilitate our graphic exposition while retaining the essential
relations of Buchanan's model we reduce the utility function he used,
n/). (x/. (X^.
to:
(1) [(X^^, 1), (}^^. NjSl.
Is the quantity of a composite purely-private good consumed by
individual i in a club of optimum size equal to one. ^ Is the
quantity of the impurely public good which the individual consumes in
a club of members. We assume that the marginal utility of both
and Xj is positive and for reasons explained below we assume that
the marginal utility of N- is negative for all N > 1. Figure 1
J J
Illustrates an indifference surface for X , X , N plotted on a graph
IT J J
in which the origin corresponds to (X , X , K ) = (0, 0, 1). For any
r J J
value of N , the indifference
J
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
surface displays the usual property of a diminishing marginal rate
of substitution (MRS) between X^ and X .
•J r
Considering the slope of the indifference surface in the N_
J
direction points to an apparent inconsistency in Buchanan's exposition
He asserts in a footnote [3, p. 2, note 1] that the economic theory of
clubs deals only with economic motivations for joining clubs and that
"in so far as individuals join clubs for comraderie, as such, the
theory does not apply." However, in his figure one, which displays
cost and benefit levels in relation to the nxjmber of users of a fixed
size facility, the benefit curve initially rises before declining.
This construction Implies that the individual would seek fellow club
members to share in the ownership and consumption of X even if doing
tj
so did not reduce his costs. In our view this would Involve joining
a club solely for comraderie and is therefore Inconsistent with the
contents of Buchanan's footnote.
To be consistent with Buchanan's benefit curve construction our
indifference curves would decline in the Nj direction over a limited
range then begin to rise when the value of additional comraderie
is offset by congestion. However, if comraderie as a motive to join
clubs is excluded a la Buchanan's footnote, then the indifference
surface has positive slope in the Nj direction for all Nj > 1. We
have opted for the latter construction for the following reason.
Since N_ is the number of persons who share ownership-consumption rights,
J
it is the nxnnber who share control over use of the facility. Having
a private facility with N_ » 1 does not preclude comraderie in its
J
use, but it does give the owner exclusive control over use of the
facility by others. Therefore it seems that = 1 will be preferred
to N > 1 by all persons whose desires for companionship can be satisfied
by invited friends joining him in consumption of his privately owned
facilty. Buchanan's construction applies only to those persons whose
desire for companionship cannot be met by invited friends and who find
clubs appealing because of the guaranteed companionship they provide.
Whether the indifference surfaces decline before rising or rise
monotonlcally in the Nj direction is of limited significance, however,
because the club member's budget constraint is such that the equilibrium
always occurs at a point where the indifference surface has positive
slope with respect to N^.
We reduce Buchanan's general form of the "cost or production
function as this confronts the individual,"
= N^^), +
to:
(2) F- F^ [(X^, 1), (Xj , Nj )].
The equilibrium conditions derived by Buchanan for the case of n + m
goods are retained in this condensed form of the model. The Lagrangean
expression for utility maximization subject to the contraints of the
production function is:
(3) L=U^[(X^, 1), (Xj, Nj)] +jj r[(Xj., 1). (Xj, Nj)]
Eliminating ^ from the necessary first order conditions produces the
equivalent of Buchanan's equation 7:
(4)
^r ^NJ
Rearranging the first two terms gives Buchanan's equation 5,
(5) "j = :
U^ f ^
r r
and rearranging the second and third terms gives Buchanan*s equation 6,
f ^
r r
A third aspect of the equilibrium, which is implicit in condition 4 but
was not explicitly considered by Buchanan, is obtained by rearranging
the first and third terms:
i i •
This condition is explicit in Polinsky's exposition of the model
[9, p. 172]. The exact form of the production function confronting
the individual depends upon both the cost conditions of production
and the cost sharing arrangments of the club. If the unit cost of
Xj. is independent of the quantity purchased, if costs are equally
shared by all club members, and if the individual can costlessly
find others to Join him in a club, the individual's budget constraint
is:
(8) y = X^ +
N.
where y represents the individual's income, is the annual service
cost per unit of X , and the price of X equals one.^ When this
constraint is used in the Lagrangean of 3, the equilibrion conditions
4, 5, 6, and 7 take the following forms:
(4a) u/ u/
'N
(5a) ^ /Nj
r
(6a) ^ ^ X^j ^
r J
Vj
1(7a) "j
Although an equilibrium can be defined by any two of conditions
5, 6, and 7, each condition describes a separate aspect of full
equilibrium. Condition 5 states that the MRS between the composite
private good X and the club good X_ will be equated to the cost per
r J
member of an additional unit of the club good; with the budget contraint
^j/of 8, this price is /Nj* Condition 6 states that in equilibrium, the
MRS between the composite private good and additional club members,
will be equated to the price of additional members, which with 8, is
-XjPj/
equal to / 2 • The negative sign reflects the fact that spreading the
/Nj
cost of a fixed amount of club goods over more members reduces dues
per member. Finally condition 7 states that in equilibrium the MRS
between additional club goods and additional members will be equated to the
(negative of the) increment to the club's goods provided by the addition
of each member to the club. This quantity is the ratio of the "price"
of additional members and the per capita price of additional units of
the club good.
Several graphic descriptions of these equilibrium conditions are
possible. Buchanan's and schedules are plots in N , X
space which satisfy respectively, conditions 5 and 6, and the
intersection of the two schedules defines the point where condition 4
2
holds. Since condition 7 is implicit in A, it also holds at this point.
Our figure 2 contains both the club budget constraint and an Indifference
surface for persons with Incomes of y» and Identical preferences;
it shows, in one figure, the conditions which hold in club equilibrium.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
In this diagram the inverse of the slope of the budget constraint in
^J/X^, Xj space is ; at point A, the MRS between X^ and Xj is equated
to the per capita price of additional club goods for a club of given
membership. The slope of the budget constraint in X_, N- space is
Y J J
J // ; at point A, this value is equated to the MRS between additional
J
club members and additional club goods. Condition 6 may also be described
in this diagram; it is considered below in our discussion of income
effects.
Condition 7 provides interesting insights into the differences
among private, public, and club goods, particularly the conditions
under which clubs with unique and finite memberships of more than one
will emerge. This disucssion is facilitated by expressing this aspect
of the equilibrium in terms of the elasticity of Xj with respect to Nj
on the budget constraint and on the indifference surfaces. Solving the
budget constraint of 8 for X^ produces
•J
N
Xj - (y - X_) /„ . Thus,
aXj y - X^ Xj
J-J /»J
and the elasticity of club goods, X., with respect to additional
/dues-paying members, N^, which is defined as , is equal
J J
to one along the budget constraint for any level of club dues per member
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Given this, the elasticity of Xj with respect to Nj (e) on the
indifference surface determines the equilibrium club size. With the
budget constraint assumed here, a unique and finite equilibrium
greater than one exists only if this elasticity Is less Chan one at
m is equal to one at a unique Nj, and is greater than one for all
larger values of Nj. Such a case was illustrated in Figure 2.
The existence of a range wherein e < 1 is quite plausible for goods
containing some publlcneffi.as is a point where the publlcness is
exhausted and ® = 1. However, an explanation for the existence of a
range wherein 6 > 1 is more elusive, e > 1 requires that club members
be made worse off by equal proportionate increases in club facilities
and membership. If congestion is measured by density of people relative
to facilities, then congestion does not explain g > 1, because equal
percentage changes of Xj and Nj do not Increase density. The difficulty
of identifying an explanation for e > 1 for goods having a range of
publicness (e < 1) suggests that in some cases the elasticity may equal
one over a large range of N_, If this is so, there may be no unique
equilibrium membership level for clubs which provide these goods,
given the budget constraint assumed here.
There may, however, be reasons for assuming a budget constraint
along which the elasticity is not always equal to one. With such a
budget constraint, there may be a unique equilibrium membership level,
even if the elasticity on the indifference surface is equal to one
along a range of Nj. A budget constraint along which the elasticity
is not always equal to one may result from decreasing returns to scale
in the production of the club good; from transactions costs involved
11
In the act of sharing; or from maintenance costs on shared durable goods.
Maintenance costs may increase more than in proportion to use when the
goods are moved from private to Joint ownership because shared ownership
reduces the individual's share of the costs resulting from carelessness
or misuse.
Purely Private and Purely Public Goods
The X-, N- sub-space of figure 2 illustrates condition 7a and
J J
may be used to show the special cases of purely private and purely
public goods. According to the widely accepted private good definition
used by Samuelson [10], a good is private if consumption of it is rival.
Buchanan prefers to avoid such a priori definitions and would presumably
classify as private, those goods for which the optimum club size is
one. As he states, "A good for which the equilibrium value of Nj is
large can be classified as containing much 'publicness.* By contrast,
a good for which the equilibrium value of Nj is small can be classified
as largely private" (3, p.6]. For goods which are private in the
Samuelson sense, the elasticity of substitution between the good and
more sharers of it along an indifference surface is at least equal to
one. If e = 1 a club provides no economic advantages; in Xj, space the
indifference surfaces and budget constraints coincide. If e > 1, as it
will be if the act of sharing per se is disliked, the optimum club size
is one; this case is illustrated in figure 3 which contains the relevant
portions of two indifference surfaces and budget constraints.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
The special case of the purely public good, characterized by
completely non-rival consumption, is represented by indifference surfaces
which are flat in the Nj direction indicating that expansion of the sharing
12
group does not diminish the benefits received by other users of the
existing X^. Plotting this relation along with the relevant portion of the
budget constraint provides a graphic demonstration of the well-known
fact that any finite sharing group for purely public goods is too small
because the dues of additional members will increase the quantity of
Xj available to all club members without diminishing the benefits
received from it by existing members. As long as incremental X^ is
positively valued, there is reason to expand the club's dues paying
membership. This case is Illustrated in figure 4.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
A problem with the Buchanan notion of a public good is that it
falls to distinguish between the type of good which is purely public
a la Samuelson and goods which are not purely public, but which
are sufficiently public to result in an equilibrium club size of
infinity; the latter case is illustrated in figure 5. Pure publicness
is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition, for an equilibrium
size of infinity; a necessary condition is that the good be such that
the e of Xj with respect to Nj. along the indifference surface be
less than one for all values of Nj. While such goods contain much
publicness, they are not purely public a la Samuelson.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
Income Effects and Equilibrium Club Membership
Previous expositions of the theory of clubs have assumed that all
individuals have equal income and Identical tastes and preferences. We
retain the assumption of identical preferences but relax the assumption
regarding Income by assuming that different Incomes exist and that
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there are enough people at each Income level to form the equilibrium
club for that Income group. This framework implies two related results.
One is that segregation by income levels Is a result of full equilibrium;
the corollary Is that changes In Income will generally motivate one to
change clubs. If the income elasticity of demand for club services Is
different from zero, then there will be different equilibrium clubs
for each different Income group.
A, Quantity of Club Good Fixed
Buchanan notes (3, p. 12, note 1] that his analysis "suggests
clearly that the optimal club size, for any quantity of good, will tend
to become smaller as the real Income of an individual is Increased."
An extracted two-dimensional portion of our graph depicting condition
(6a) provides a demonstration that this is generally true, given the
constraint that the quantity of the club good Is fixed. However, as
shown In the next section, equilibrium club membership does not
necessarily decrease as income rises, if the quantity of the club good
Is unconstrained.
Figure 6 describes the relations between X and N. for a fixed level
r j
of the club good. It is extracted from figure 2, with fixed. The
X P
slope of this portion of the budget constraint, — = -
n2 '
illustrates the (diminishing) reduction of dues per member permitted
by expansion of membership. The slope of this portion of the
indifference surface reflects the reduction of dues which the member
ship requires to willingly accept another user of their fixed-size
facility.
lA
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
If the equilibrium at point A Is disturbed by an Increase In income
to y', the individual finds himself at point A'. At point A* the slope
X P /
of the budget constraint 1^2 is the same as at point A, but if
is subject to diminishing marginal utility, the marginal rate of
substitution of Nj. for X^ will be more at A' than at A, and a higher
indifference surface can be attained by reducing membership to
attain point B.
B. Income Effect in General
Next we consider the effect of a change In Income without the
above constraint on the amount of the club good. This analysis is
facilitated by using the concept of sharing technologies [A, pp. 3-4]
and the variable X , defined as the level of club services provided
d
by combinations of Xj and Nj,
This permits reduction of the utility function of eqtiatlon (1)
^ 1), (X^, Nj)]
to
(10)
The sharing technology of equation 9 determines the shape of Xg
Isoquants. The plot of these "isoquants*'in Xj, Nj space is equivalent
to the previously discussed Indifference curves between X^ and N- for
^ J J
fixed levels of 3L. Both show combinations of X, and N, between which the
J J
Individual Is Indifferent. One set of such isoquants is depicted
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in Figure 7a, which also contains budget constraints for clubs with
different levels of dues per member. Since the origin is (Xj, Nj) =
(0, 0), all constraints pass through the origin. The slope of each
Aj'
constraint is ", the additional Xj provided by the dues (D^) of each
added member. The fact that this slope increases with the level of club
dues illustrates the previously neglected fact that the incentive to
expand membership increases with the level of dues.
The tangencies between the Xg isoquants and the budget constraints
identify the most efficient X , combinations for the provision
J J
of each Xg level. The corresponding dues are the cost per member of
each service level. The locus of such tangencies determines the
function:
(11) - D^(Xg).
The individual who may choose among clubs effeclently providing various
service levels has the budget constraint
(12) y = + D'(Xg)
illustrated in figure 7b. The (negative of the) slope of the constraint
is the marginal cost, of moving to a club with a higher service level,
[Insert Figure 7 about here]
Equilibrium seirvice level is determined in figure 7b by the tangency
between the individual's budget constraint and the highest attainable
indifference curve. The optimal combination of Xj and Nj for the
provision of that service level appears in figure 7a.^
An increase of Income moves the individual from the prior
equilibrium at A to A' in figure 7b. If X and X are both normal
jT S
goods, point A' is inferior to point B, which is attainable by spending
16
part of the Income increment on the higher annual dues of a club
providing the service level Xg" corresponding to point B. Clubs providing
this service level most effeciently have membership and facilities
corresponding to point F in figure 7a.
Whether the high income clubs providing higher service levels will
in equilibrium have smaller or larger memberships than lower service
level clubs depends on the characteristics of the sharing technology
applicable to the good X^. The expected desire of the rich to reduce
the number with whom they share is at least partially offset by the
high contributions of additional members in high dues clubs. The
result depends on the elasticity of substitution between Xj and along
the X isoquants. Since the club budget constraints of figure 7a have
s
constant unitary elasticity, the equilibrium membership for each
service level occurs at the point of unitary elasticity on the isoquant.
It is plausible that the slope of the isoquants above any given Nj
will increase with the service level, because generally the increment
required to maintain a high service level while enlarging membership
exceeds the required increment to maintain a lower service level. Were
it not for the greater slope of high-dues clubs* budget constraints
the increasing steepness of the isoquants would lead to smaller
equilibrium memberships in high dues-high income clubs. However, the
increasing slope at least partially offsets this effect and may result
in larger memberships in high-dues clubs than in low-dues clubs. We
find no a priori basis for predicting the net effect. However, this
relationship probably explains why many high income persons join clubs
instead of privately providing all their consumed goods.
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Notice that the preceding analysis provides an economic explanation
for the tendency of persons with increased income to leave their old
clubs and join clubs comprised of higher income Individuals. The
person who stays in his original club after an increase in his Income
is at point A' in figure 7b. This is an equilibrium position only If
his income elasticity of demand for club services is zero. If
higher club services are desired at the higher income level, there is
a sound economic reason to move to a club comprised of higher income
persons paying higher dues.^
Price Effects
The effect of club good price changes upon equilibrium club
membership is similarly Indetermlnant. The effect of a reduction in Pj
is illustrated in figure 8.
[Insert Figure 8 about here]
The price reduction decreases both the cost of attaining each X level
and the marginal cost of moving to a higher level. The resulting
shift of the individual budget constraint is illustrated in figure 8b.
There is both an income and a pure price effect in the direction of
increased consumption of club services* X . As In the case of an
increase in Income, the change in equilibrium Nj is unpredictable because
again the point of unitary elasticity on the higher Xg isoquant may
lie to the left or right of the point of unitary elasticity on the lower
Xg isoquant which was the equilibrium prior to the price change.
Notice that the effect of a price change (or a change in income)
upon the equilibrium club good level is also Indeterminate. While
18
Increased Income or a decrease In the price of the club good will
generally result in increased equllibrluin consumption of club services,
the optimal combination of club facilities and membership for the
provision of this increased service level relative to the prior
equilibrium is Indeterminate. The difference between the two equilibrium
states depends on the sharing technology applicable to the good and
cannot be predicted in general.
As in the standard two-private goods case, the effect of the
change in the price of the club good upon the club's purchases of it
can be separated into a substitution and an income effect. In the
standard two-private goods model, these effects can be examined and the
Slutsky equation may be derived by differentiation of the first order
conditions for utility maximization subject to a budget constraint
[5, pp. 31-32]. As our appendix shows, applying this procedure to the
previously discussed first-order conditions for club equilibrium,
produces the following "Slutsky equation", in which the effect of a
price change on club good purchases Is separated into a substitution and
income effect.
(13) . r axA Xj
•j V^jju\ / U « constant / prices • constant.
This expression differs from the standard Slutsky equation In that the
coefficient of the Income effect in (13) is X /N rather than X . Notice
w J J
that this generalization of the Slutsky equation encompasses the special
case of two-private goods, in which • 1. The explanation for the X_/N_
j J j
coefficient of the income effect lies in the budget constraint of club
members. This constraint assumes that club costs are equally shared, so
19
that each member pays only 1/N of the cost of club goods. It follows
that the income effect of a change in the club good*s price is only 1/N_
J
of what it would be if each individual paid the full cost of consumed club
goods.
As was previously Illustrated, a decrease in the price of will
generally result in an increased level of club services consumption, but
the movement to the higher service level generally envolves an adjustment
in both Xj and Nj. Equation (13) separated the adjustment of X^ into a
substitution and an income effect. Analogously the adjustment of N- may
be written as
(14) ^
ap, ° I ap,; „ " nJ \ J / U •» constant J \/ prices = constant.
Again it is noteworthy that the coefficient of the income effect, X./N ,
J J
reflects the assumption that the cost of X. is shared equally among the
J
Nj members of the consuming group.
Our conclusion regarding price effects is that decreased club good
prices result in greater consumption of club good services, but one cannot
predict a priori whether club good price changes will lead to increases or
decreases in equilibrium club membership and club purchases of club goods.
Conclusion
The theory of clubs has filled a significant gap in economic theory,
Berglas*s demonstration that the market may efficiently provide the services
of some club goods is interesting, but it does not negate the relevance of
the theory of clubs to public finance theory. Although there are examples
of market provision of club services, there are also many examples of club
20
good provision by clubs per se and by various levels of government.
Our exposition of the theory clarifies some ambiguities in the
original formulation regarding comraderie, congestion, and the difference
between purely public goods and club goods. Although the effects of
club good price changes are not very surprising, our consideration of
income effects has provided several significant results. We have shown
that, even if all individuals have Identical preferences, they will
segregate themselves by income groups in communities providing different
levels of club good services. We have also shown that increased income
does not necessarily result in clubs with fewer members, and that high
income individuals will not necessarily remove themselves from sharing
arrangements, because the economic incentive to add members to a sharing
arrangement is actually stronger in a high-dues club than in a low-dues
club.
21
Appendix
Derivation of the Slutsky equation describing the effect of a change in
the price of the club good on the club's purchases of the good begins
with the Lagrangean expression for utility maximization subject to a
budget constraint:
L= 1), (Xj, Nj)] +Xly - - PjXjNj'"-]
A rational individual will plan his expenditures so that the first-order
conditions for utility maximization subject to the budget constraint are
satisfied:
%="j ->Vj"' =°
^ +XWj"' • °
= y - X - P^x N = 0
oX r J J J
The effect of price and Income changes on the individual's expenditure
decisions are determined by allowing all variables to vary simultaneously,
accomplished here total differentiation of the first-order conditions:
U ,dX^ + U dX + U „dN, - d> = 0
rJ J rr r rN J ^
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("hJ+ +Vr+ <"nN -
Solution of these four equations for the four unknowns, dXj, dX^, dN^,
and dji, can be determined by treating the terms on the right hand sides
as constants. Derivation of the solution is facilitated by using the
matrix expression:
U
JJ
U
rJ
"nj ^ ^Vj
-2
-1
U
Jr
U
rr
U,
Nr
-1
-p N
J J"JK +
U
rN
•1
W/'
-2
Wj 0
dX.
dX
dN.
-2
dP,
-1-dy + XjNj ^dPj
The matrix on the left is the bordered Hessian matrix. The second order
conditions for utility maximization subject to the budget constraint are
satisfied if the determinant of this matrix is negative definite. The
borders of the bordered Hessian are composed of the negatives of the
implicit prices of X-, X , N., and X respectively.
J r J
If the determinant of the bordered Hessian is denoted by D and the
cofactor of the element in the gth row and hth column of the matrix by
the solution for dX by Cramer's rule can be expressed as:
J
dXj =
+D3^(-x«jN/2dp_j) +D^^(.cly +XjN/^dPj)
D
If the individual's lacooae and the price of the numeraire good are assumed
to remain unchanged, dy * 0, and the overall effect of a change in the
price of the club good on the club's purchases of the club good is
determined by dividing both sides of this expression by dP,:
J
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El +D3^(-xXA"'')3Pj = D
The change In X which results from a change in the individual's income
J
while prices are held constant is determined by setting dPj « 0 and
dividing the above expression for dXj by dy:
^Sy / prices = constant D
The change in X which results from a change in the price of the club
good while utility is held constant is more difficult to determine. It
utility is held constant, dU » 0, and taking the total differential of the
utility function produces:
dU = U^dX, + U dX + U„dN, - 0 .
J J r r N J
From the first-order conditions, the following relationships can be derived:
, —
Vj ' Wj"'
By solving each of these for the respective partial derlvltlve, substi
tuting these into the total differential of the utility function, and
dividing the resulting expression by -x, it can be shown that:
- ° •
If this is so, then from the fourth of the total differential equations
resulting from the first-order conditions:
-dy +XjNj'^ dPj =0.
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Using this Information, the change In X which results from a change In
•J
the price of the club good while utility Is held constant Is determined
by again setting dy " 0 and dividing the expression for dX^ by dP^:
W.
Dll(XN/b H- D3i(-XXjN/^)
U = constant
From this and the expressions for and (^j/Sy) prices » constant,
the Slutsky equation can be written and (^./^-) can be broken down into
•J tj
a substitution and inccnne effect:
^X,
\^J/ U = constant
X, Z'SX.S)
. -JL
N.
/ prices « constant.
The analogous expression for the effect of a change in the price of the
club good on the equilibrium club membership can similarly be derived
from the same set of total differential equations.
25
NOTES
* The authors are Assistant Professor and Graduate Student in
Economics at Iowa State University. We are grateful to
Harvey E. Lapan, for his assistance during the development of
this paper, and to George W. Ladd and Charles W. Meyer, for
helpful comments on a preliminary draft^ but the authors are
solely responsible for any remaining errors.
1. This form of the budget constraint, and the utility function In
our equation 2, are essentially equivalent to those used by Polinsky
[9 p. 172] in his consideration of possible extensions of the theory
of clubs.
2. Mathematically the N^ curve can be derived by differentiating
equation 3 with respect to X , N , and X, while treating X as a
parameter, and solving the first order conditions for N_ in terms
of X-. Likewise, the curve can be derived by differentiating
3 with respect to X^, Xj, and A, while treating N. as a parameter,
and solving the first order conditions for X in terms of N . The
intersection of the two curves, found by equating them, corresponds
to the equilibrium, where both equations 5 and 6, as well as
equation 7, are satisfied.
3. Thus our results are similar to the "Tlebout effect" [11]. The
difference is that here only incomes differ; in Tiebout's nK>del
preferences differ.
4« The constraints shown in 7b assume that higher service levels
(which are measured ordlnally) are attained under increasing cost^
the special case of constant costs would be shown with straight-
line budget constraints. Our results hold in both situations.
5, The alternative of gratuitously supplementing the services of
his old club with the increment to his Income is less appealing than
joining another club in which his contribution would be matched
by the dues of other members. Using his entire increment to supple
ment club A's facilities will put the club members at a point to the
right of A, but short of budget line y^.
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